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AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION

This essay is adapted from the article
"Class-Based Affinnative Action: Lessons
and Caveats," which originally appeared in
74 Texas Law Review 1847. Copyright 1996
by the Texas Law Review Association.
Reprinted by pennission. For a complete
version with all citations please contact the
editor of Law Quadrangle Notes.

look
[carefully]
before you
leap

BY DEBORAH

C.

MALAMUD

When the Supreme Court applied
"strict scrutiny" to federal race-based
affirmative action programs in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995), it
suggested that the constitutional-law
coast remains clear for affirmative
action programs based on relative
economic disadvantage - usually
called "class-based" affirmative action.
"Class, not race" is a conservative war
cry in contemporary American politics.
But it should not be forgotten that legal
thinkers on the left have long sought
the legal recognition of economic
inequality - or, even better, of "class"
- as a force in American life and that
Adarand is a step in that direction
Until now, American legal
institutions have not developed a
coherent discourse on the nature of
economic inequality Nor has American
society at large. In particular, there has
long been debate as to whether the
economic inequality that exists in this
country can fairly be called a "class
system." It would thus be a major step
for legal institutions to operationalize a
definition of "economic disadvantage"
or (even more so) of class - let alone
to do so in the hotly contested arena of
affirmative action. The stakes of the
enterprise reach beyond the law itself:
there is every reason to believe that the
law will help to create, rather than
merely reflect, the dominant discourse
on class and inequality in this country
- just as the law has done in the case
of race. For those who seek a place for
economic inequality or class in
American legal and political discourse,
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There is strong
reason to believe
on theoretical and
empirical grounds
that class must
be measured
differently for men
and women and
that the same
economic factor
(for example,
educational level,
a "professional"
career) will often
have different
meanings for
whites and blacks.
But any attempt by
a legislature or
other public body
to adopt a class
metric that
recognizes
interactions among
race, ethnicity,
gender, and class
might well be
struck down by the
Court as a
subterfuge, a
reintroduction of
race- and genderbased affirmative
action through the
back door.
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then, Adarand's invitation is good news
only if the legal system can be expected
to "get it right."
When I speak of "getting it right,"
I place a dual burden on governmental
actors charged with creating or
supervising programs of class-based
affirmative action. One aspect of "getting
it right" is to operationalize the
phenomenon of economic inequality in a
way that accomplishes the redistributive
task of class-based affirmative action and
makes the results seem legitimate. I refer
to a program that "gets it right" to this
extent as "technically adequate." A
program can be technically adequate,
however, while at the same time
contributing nothing (or nothing
positive) to the public understanding of
the phenomenon on which it operates.
For example, those responsible for classbased affirmative action could attempt to
legitimate the program by bringing it
into harmony with the publics
misapprehensions of the nature of
economic inequality What I mean by
"getting it right" is achieving the technical
goals of class-based affirmative action in a
manner that also advances public
discourse on the question of economic
inequality A program that meets this
second, more ambitious, goal is not
merely "technically adequate" but also
"culturally adequate." This paper is
animated by the view that government
policy-makers should be concerned with
the cultural adequacy of their programs,
particularly where (as here) they touch on
fundamental issues of personal and
group identity

CLASS AND THE LAW:
MODELS AND CONSTRAINTS
Two basic models of economic
inequality compete in the American
ideological marketplace, each with two
major versions. Any coherent attempt by
the legal system to implement a program
of class-based affirmative action will
inevitably embrace one of these
competing perspectives.
One view - which I will call
economic individualism - depicts the
American economic order as completely
open to economic mobility for those
individuals with the gumption to pursue

it. The economic individualist view
admits (as it must) that at any given
moment individuals occupy a wide range
of positions on a continuum of economic
attainment. But this distribution is seen
as a result of, rather than a constraint on,
free market forces. So long as there is
sufficient mobility by individuals, the
inequalities in the rewards accorded to
different positions are of no theoretical or
political importance.
A more moderate version of economic
individualism - and the only form of
economic individualism that an advocate
of class-based affirmative action could
embrace - is what one might call prointerventionist economic individualism.
Here, it is admitted that past economic
position is a constraint on future
economic position; for example, that lack
of economic resources can interfere with
an individuals capacity to make the
investments in human capital necessary
for advancement. It is thus perceived as
necessary to make a modest level of
economic assistance available on the basis
of need at certain key junctures of
personal economic development financial aid for college, for example.
Once modest assistance is given, previous
experiences of economic disadvantage are
deemed no longer relevant to future
success.
The other major perspective on
economic inequality posits the existence
of class - a structured system of
inequality (as opposed to a simple
unequal distribution of economic
outcomes among individuals) that is
intrinsic to the economic realm and that
is not fundamentally altered by the
economic mobility of individuals. What
distinguishes class perspectives from
individualist perspectives on economic
inequality is that class perspectives are
inherently social (as opposed to
individual) and diachronic (as opposed to
synchronic). Class is social in the dual
sense that the class system is inherent in
and perpetuated by the structure of
economic relations in the society and that
shared class position has the potential for
being mobilized as the basis for both
group identity and political action. Class
is diachronic in the triple sense that class
position is (1) intergenerationally
transmitted, (2) mediated through the
strategic behavior of social actors over
time, and (3) incapable of being

understood without reference to patterns
of change in the economic organization of
the society
Finally, there is an alternative version
of a belief in class, which builds on the
meaning of class just described, but goes
beyond it. In this view, class is said to
interact with race, gender, and ethnicity
(and perhaps other elements of social
identity, such as place of residence) in
interlocking and mutually defining
structures, and it is their interaction
that is seen to shape both consciousness
and life chances. One of the many
consequences of this view, if it is correct,
is that class analysis can never be raceor gender-blind and therefore cannot
strictly be viewed as an alternative to the
traditional foci of antidiscrimination law
and policy
The Supreme Court would enter this
debate on the nature of economic
inequality (should it choose to do so)
with a predisposition toward economic
individualism (albeit in its prointerventionist form). Indeed, that
predisposition is the underpinning for the
very willingness of the Adarand Court to
evaluate disadvantage-based affirmative
action using the lowest level of
constitutional scrutiny In the postLochner (post-1905) world of Footnote
Four of Carolene Products (1938), the
Court understands the Fourteenth
Amendment to mean that legislatures are
free to legislate in the economic realm
(including, as the New Deal cases
establish, to legislate remedies for
excesses of economic inequality) because
economic relations are not seen as
involving "discrete and insular minorities"
incapable of taking care of themselves
through the political process. The notion
that some economic interests and
relations may divide people into "groups"
(as class analysis would suggest) and do
so in a manner bearing at least a family
resemblance to divisions by race, religion,
or national origin, was not entertained in
Carolene Products when it heralded a
regime of "rationality review" for all
economically based distinctions.
Furthermore, Equal Protection Clause
constraints might well stand in the way of
any effort to introduce into the law a view
of class (or even of economic inequality
in the economic individualist sense) that
is inextricably linked to race or gender.
Under the three-tiered structure of

constitutional scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause, economically based
distinctions are subject to rationality
review, gender-based distinctions to
intermediate scrutiny and race-based
distinctions to strict scrutiny There is
strong reason to believe on theoretical
and empirical grounds that class must be
measured differently for men and women
and that the same economic factor (for
example, educational level, a
"professional" career) will often have
different meanings for whites and blacks.
But any attempt by a legislature or other
public body to adopt a class metric that
recognizes interactions among race,
ethnicity, gender, and class might well be
struck down by the Court as a
subterfuge, a reintroduction of race- and
gender-based affirmative action through
the back door. This means that even if
the Court were to approve a legislative
embrace of class theory, the constraints of
equal protection doctrine might
nonetheless bar the view that class is
inextricably linked to race and gender the view of class that, I argue, most fits
the facts of contemporary American life.

MEASURING
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
In choosing a model of economic
inequality or class for class-based
affirmative action, the legal system will be
constrained not only by ideology but by
practical and conceptual problems of
measurement. All of the social sciences
are replete with literature on the question
of economic inequality and economic
mobility The legal system has much to
learn from the efforts of other disciplines
to capture this complex phenomenon.
Because a method of measuring
economic inequality must be well suited
to the particular problem to be solved, it
is important to note at the outset the
specific line-drawing problem that must
be faced by a system of class-based
affirmative action. It has been
persuasively argued, chiefly by sociologist
William Julius Wilson, that affirmative

action programs tend to benefit those
who have already risen out of the lower
classes. In periods of growth of good
unskilled jobs, affirmative action can
reach, and seems to have reached, less
advantaged workers. But our economy is
no longer creating family-supporting jobs
for unskilled workers with poor literacy
and numeracy skills - especially not in
inner cities. Instead, one must have
already attained a certain level of
education to benefit from affirmative
action programs in economic sectors with
jobs that have career-wage potential. To
benefit from set-aside programs, a
business has to be sufficiently capitalized
to do the contract work. To be a
candidate for affirmative action in higher
education, one must have finished high
school and taken college-preparatory
courses, prerequisites that place those in
the bottom of the economic hierarchy out
of contention. It is thus important to
recognize, popular tropes
notwithstanding, that class-based
affirmative action is not about
"Appalachian coal miners" or the
"underclass." Any system of class-based
affirmative action is likely to have the task
of distinguishing among candidates who
occupy positions within the broad middle
of the American socioeconomic structure.
Unfortunately, theorizing and
operationalizing distinctions within the
middle classes is the most difficult task
faced by social scientific scholarship on
class, one on which there is little
consensus.

THE SHAPE OF ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY: CONTINUA,
CATEGORIES, AND CONFLICTS
On the broadest level, economic
inequality can be represented in one of
three ways. Under one view, relative
economic advantage is represented as
gradational: as a continuous sliding scale
of relative economic position, rank
ordered according to one or more
specified criteria. The continuum may
then be divided for convenience into
categories (such as "lower class," "lower
middle class," "upper middle class," etc.)
by assigning labels to certain ranges on
the continuum. But the validity of the
gradational model does not turn on any
notion that the theorists groupings
LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES FALL/WINTER
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identify groups of people with similar
patterns of consciousness and action.
Under the categorical approach,
economic space is divided in a
noncontinuous manner on the basis of
the criterion that is, according to the
relevant theory, the most significant
indicator of economic status. The classic
example of a categorical approach is the
importance placed by some scholars on
the distinction between blue-collar
(manual) and white-collar (nonmanual)
employment. It is generally contended
that the theorists' categories capture
"native" distinctions - in other words,
that they describe patterns of affinity and
difference that motivate social action.
Finally, under the relational approach,
the groups that matter for the analysis of
economic inequality are identified not
merely by patterns of affinity and
difference, but also by their intrinsically
antagonistic social relations with other
economic groups. Just as the elements
within such classic pairings as "parent
and child" and "master and servant" take
their meaning only in relationship to each
other, relational perspectives see each
economic grouping as existing only with
reference to and in tension with the
others.
Legal decisionmakers designing
programs of class-based affirmative action
will most likely be drawn to the
gradational approach. It most suits the
economic individualist view that
economic attainment is a matter of
market ordering rather than of group
formation or group-based experience. It
also appears, at least at first glance, to be
relatively well suited to the task at hand.
A system of affirmative action exists - so
it seems - to choose among different
candidates for positions (be they college
admissions slots, jobs, or government
contracts). A gradational approach makes
it possible to compare the ranked
economic positions of the different
candidates and give the position to the
qualified person with the lowest
economic rank Best of all, its major flaw
- its inability to define discrete classes
- hardly seems relevant if the task of
affirmative action is so defined.
The gradational approach, however,
has a less obvious but no less relevant
flaw. Of all the rival approaches, it
provides the weakest basis for defending
class-based affirmative action on moral
64
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grounds. Class-based affirmative action is
likely to do its work by redistributing
economic opportunities among
individuals who stand relatively close
together in the gradational hierarchy it offers opportunities to the strongest
"have-nots" at the expense of the weakest
"haves." Slight differences in relative
economic position are hardly strong
justifications for governmental
intervention, and the intervention is
likely to generate all the more resentment
as a result. Inevitably, defenders of the
program would seek stronger alternative
justifications - justifications that cannot
readily be supported under the
gradational approach. Class-based
affirmative action could be defended as
promoting diversity, but gradational
approaches do not claim to identify lines
of especially salient difference in group
attitudes and social experience (in
"consciousness") . For that, one needs a
categorical or relational approach. The
program could be defended through
claims of distributive justice that work
best when the gains of the economic
"haves" are ill-gotten, but only relational
approaches claim that the current
distribution of economic assets is due to
the exercise of illegitimate power by the
"haves" over the "have-nots."

WHOSE ECONOMIC INEQUALITY?
INDIVIDUAL VERSUS HOUSEHOLD
OR FAMILY AS THE RELEVANT
UNIT OF ANALYSIS
In discussing economic inequality, one
cannot go far without confronting the
question of whose economic position is
to be measured. Many studies use the
individual worker as the unit of analysis.
But in any household or family with
more than one worker, each workers
economic position is potentially modified
by that of the others - not only as to the
availability of second (or third) incomes,
but in all the many ways in which
economic position affects life chances.
Indeed, the household or family is the
most appropriate unit of analysis without
regard to the number of income earners
in the household.
Family and household are not the same
concept. Family may or may not involve
blood or marital ties, as work on gay and
lesbian kinship demonstrates. Divorce

creates families and households of
numerous shapes, and decision rules
must be developed to determine the
economic saliency of noncustodial
parents, of custodial stepparents, of the
subsequent spouses of noncustodial
parents, and so forth. Even in the absence
of divorce (or widowhood), families may
not fit the nuclear family image: familybased households often include other
relatives whose economic experiences can
be quite salient to all members of the
household well beyond the effects of any
income-sharing that may take place.
Substituting the "traditional" nuclear
family for the isolated individual as the
unit for measuring class position is thus
only a small step in the right direction,
and it creates myriad problems of its
own. Furthermore, class not only is
shaped by family and household
composition, but at times also shapes
family and household composition.
Measuring class position with reference to
the nuclear family mirrors middle class
kinship ideology, but fails both to accord
validity to other classes' conceptions of
family life (a flaw on the level of cultural
adequacy) and to make available for
measurement the wide range of
relationships upon which individuals are
empowered to draw for resources under
these alternative conceptions (a flaw on
the level of technical adequacy).
Furthermore, it is the intergenerational
family or household that is the
appropriate unit for understanding a
familys economic status, as is
demonstrated by an example used by
British sociologist Frank Parkin. Picture
two families, in each of which the father
is a blue-collar worker and the mother is
a high school graduate who is not
employed outside the home. In one
family, the mother is the child of a bluecollar worker: she has married within her
own class. In the other, the mother is the
child of a white-collar worker, meaning
that she has "married down." According
to a study cited by Parkin, the son of the
within-class marriage has a forty-two
percent chance of going to college, while
the son of the mother who "married
down" has an eighty percent chance of
going to college. In the dimension of
space, it is the child's interaction with his
nonworking mother that is determinative
of his college prospects. In the dimension
of time, the key to understanding the

childs life chances lies in the
grandparental generation. Without
considering the economic status of the
high school boys in light of their families
viewed in the dimensions of time and
space, the boys would appear to be
similarly situated. In reality, they are not.

TRAJECTORY
Sophisticated analyses of economic
inequality take into consideration not
merely a snapshot of an individuals (or
households or family's) economic
circumstances, but a longer view. Jobs
that require significant investments in
human capital tend to have rising
trajectories. In contrast, some occupations
are quintessential "young mans (or
womans) games" - such as sports,
dance, or physically dangerous service or
industrial jobs - in which work
opportunities and earnings decline over
time. There can be doubt as to whether
the downwardly mobile family (intra- or
intergenerational) is better or worse off
than the upwardly mobile family at the
point at which their trajectories cross.
But it is clear that a snapshot is an
oversimplification of the true position of
economically mobile families.

MEASURING RELATIVE
ECONOMIC STATUS:
THE CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
Up to this point, I have mentioned in
passing a number of factors that shape
the economic situations of individuals
and families: occupation, income,
education, orientation toward educational
attainment, and numerous extraeconomic characteristics (including race
and gender). When I have asked students
to identify their "class," they have referred
to a good number of these factors and
some others. But each factor raises its
own problems of definition and
measurement, and their interactions are
complex.
1. Wealth. I mention wealth first
precisely because it is so invisible in most
studies of economic inequality: indeed, it
is common to think of socioeconomic
status as a product of earned income,
occupation, and education, with no

regard to wealth at all. Perhaps wealth is
ignored because Americans are far more
private about their wealth than about
their incomes. As one working man is
quoted as saying, classes "can't be
[defined by] money, because nobody ever
knows that about you for sure."
Wealth is distributed far less equally
than income in American society. Wealth
barriers are strongly resistant to
intergenerational mobility, and
inequalities in wealth have greatly
increased in the United States since the
mid-1970s.
One could grant the relevance of
wealth to a culturally adequate account of
class without granting that wealth has any
relevance to the technical project of
implementing class-based affirmative
action. It is admittedly difficult to imagine
that individuals we think of as "wealthy"
will enter the affirmative-action
competition. But that failure of the
imagination stems from our failure to
recognize that "wealth" is a significant
factor in the lives of the middle classes.
Consider two competitors for a highwage job. Applicant A has a higher
current salary than applicant B perhaps substantially higher. But
Applicant Bs house down payment has
been provided for by a few nontaxable
$10,000 yearly gifts from relatives, who
can also be counted on to help out with
the childrens college tuition. Applicant A
receives no family help and is entirely
dependent on savings from wages.
Applicant B would look to be the less
"advantaged" of the two if income were
the only consideration. But Applicant B
has the wealth advantage - and that
advantage may be large enough to tip the
scales.
2. Occupation. Occupation is of
central importance to the sociological
study of class; indeed, it is common for
studies that claim to be about "social
mobility" to in fact be solely concerned
with occupational mobility.
The central tool of occupation-based
class analysis is some sort of scheme for
grouping and ranking occupations. These
scales are works of social construction on
a number of different levels, in which
some principled basis must be found for
decisionmaking - from the level of
deciding how many occupational "classes"
there are, to defining and labeling them,
to assigning 'jobs" to them.

Class-based
affirmative action is
likely to do its work
by redistributing
economic
opportunities
among individuals
who stand relatively
close together in
the gradational
hierarchy - it offers
opportunities to the
strongest "havenots" at the
expense of the
weakest "haves."
Slight differences in
relative economic
position are hardly
strong justifications
for governmental
intervention, and
the intervention is
likely to generate
all the more
resentment as a
result.
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The field is wide
open for social
scientists to
theorize the
emerging
economic order
(or orders) and, in particular,
to theorize the
elements of
comparative
advantage
among the
different segments
of the middle
classes. As a
result, there is no
reliable and timely
theory "out there"
for the law to
borrow with any
reasonable sense
that it represents a
consensus view of
the contemporary
economy of work.
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Occupations might be ranked
according to one or more of a number of
criteria, some of which are the "social
prestige" or honor they command, the
quantity and quality of credentials or
training necessary to perform them, the
degree of supervisory or managerial
authority they involve, the amount of
autonomy they afford, and their incomeeaming potential. Unless the ranking
system is to be unworkably complex,
choices must be made that are bound to
produce unnuanced results. Indeed, the
results often seem counterintuitive or
downright wrong to lay sensibilities (and
perhaps to expert sensibilities as well).
For example, where collar color plays a
central role in the occupational hierarchy,
it is considered "upward mobility" to
move, via deindustrialization, from a
position as a skilled machinist to one as a
file clerk. The problem may be that many
leading occupational schemes are
insufficiently sensitive to the progressive
deskilling of the more routine forms of
white-collar employment. But I am
prepared to surmise that the problem is a
broader one and is inherent in any effort
to transpose a multidimensional
phenomenon onto a single vertical
continuum. Furthermore, it is efforts to
rank "the middle" that are least likely to
be stable - a fact that does not bode
well for a program of class-based
affirmative action.
The picture within categories is no
more compelling. Take, for example, the
"top" category in the occupational scheme
of British sociologists Erikson and
Goldthorpe, which includes occupations
that involve the exercise of "delegated
authority or specialized knowledge and
expertise" and therefore require the
employees to be accorded a fair measure
of autonomy: Within it are placed
"supervisors of non-manual workers,"
"large proprietors" and "higher-grade
professionals" - meaning that Bill Gates
of Microsoft is grouped together with the
Microsoft employees who have the
power to hire and fire secretaries. All
professionals and high-level technicians
are included in the top category as well
(meaning, for example, that a high school
teacher and a physician would be in the
same category).
These problems of aggregation have
important consequences. Frank Parkin
has observed that "there is what might be

called a social and cultural 'buffer zone"'
between classes and that "[m]ost mobility,
being of a fairly narrow social span,
involves the movement into and out of
th[ese] zone[s] rather than movement
between the class extremes." This means
that the ability to detect mobility between
groups crucially depends on where the
lines between the groups are drawn.
Even after "occupations" have been
defined and ranked, the work of social
construction continues. The process of
assigning a persons 'job" (in either sense)
to one of a restricted number of
"occupational" categories is a complex
process, one that produces inevitable
distortions. Consider the job of
"professor," likely to be classified as
"professional/managerial" in most scales.
Then examine the differences between a
professor who strings together part-time
and temporary teaching jobs and a
tenured professor at a major research
university: Both individuals in the pair
would be classified as having the same
"occupation," but there are likely to be
gaps between them in prestige, autonomy,
job-related social networks, job benefits,
and other aspects of life and work
(beyond differences in income) that
would go uncaptured by their
occupational classification.
Finally, the problems inherent in
systems of occupational classification go
far deeper than mere problems of
measurement. Many of the leading
occupational frameworks have an
anachronistic quality to them: they are
based on theories that no longer match
the realities of work. With the demise of
private-sector unions, there are likely to
be fewer reasons in the future to be
concerned about the class placement of
good blue-collar jobs. Privatization is
putting pressure on the line between
public and private employment. Overseas
outsourcing and decreasing stability of
tenure in white-collar work, including
such highly trained "knowledge" work as
computer programming, is increasing the
commonality of job conditions across the
collar color line. Cost containment
pressures are limiting the autonomy of
the traditional professions. The middle
classes are far from becoming an
undifferentiated proletariat. But the field
is wide open for social scientists to
theorize the emerging economic order (or
orders) - and, in particular, to theorize

the elements of comparative advantage
among the different segments of the
middle classes. As a result, there is no
reliable and timely theory "out there" for
the law to borrow with any reasonable
sense that it represents a consensus view
of the contemporary economy of work.
A program of class-based affirmative
action could achieve a level of legitimacy
by relying on distinctions that have more
currency in popular culture than they in
fact deserve. If a low-level white-collar
worker "loses" to a skilled blue-collar
worker in a competition for an affirmative
action slot, the white-collar worker might
well not complain. After all, the
governments explanation reinforces his
much-threatened sense of occupational
superiority, and the reinforcement might
be worth the loss. But cultural adequacy
requires a more thoughtful effort to
capture the changing structure of
occupations - for all the difficulties
inherent in the effort.
3. Income. Many scholars focus on
income rather than on occupation as the
major force in determining relative
economic advantage. So do many lay
people. For a number of reasons, incomebased measures are particularly
compatible with the economic
individualist perspective. A stress on
income suggests that the "goodies" that
constitute relative economic advantage
(for example, knowledge, education,
cultural refinement, residence in safe
suburbs, etc.) are commodities that can
be purchased with money. An income
measure is (at least potentially) agnostic
as to the source of income and therefore
tacitly rejects the theoretical position that
the labor process is at the center of
economic relations. Finally, mobility
studies that focus on income tend to
show higher rates of intergenerational
economic mobility in the United States
than do occupation-based studies.
Income-based measures also have the
practical advantage that the measurement
of income is more straightforward than
the construction and implementation of
occupational hierarchies. But income
measurement presents a number of
methodological problems that are capable
of generating troublesome inaccuracies,
both in measuring individual cases and in
depicting economic mobility.
First among the issues in income
measurement is the question of whose

income it is appropriate to measure.
Many studies of income inequality look
solely at the incomes of individual
earners, in part because this information
is easily obtained (from employers and
from tax returns, for example). But
households routinely pool income, so
that the more accurate measure of
economic position is "family" or
"household" income - the measurement
of which is complex. Even at the level of
the individual, conventional measures of
income tend to understate the economic
position of high-income individuals and
families by excluding the value of
employee benefits (for example, pensions
and health benefits). And high-income
taxpayers have the greatest opportunities
to shelter income from taxation, which
means that relying on tax returns as the
source of income data understates their
economic advantage.
Once a measure of income is agreed
upon, there remains the question of how
(if at all) to determine which income
levels correspond to meaningful "breaks"
- whether for purposes of a gradational
or a categorical scheme. The first
question is whether the breaks are to be
determined in absolute terms, in relative
terms, or in terms of the purchasing
power of the income. Another important
question is the number of groupings to
use. A fairly common approach is to
divide individuals into quintiles
according to income and then study
mobility between quintiles. But mobility
between two adjacent quintiles - the
most common form of mobility - may
not be much mobility at all: it may
simply represent a trading of positions
between those with income locations at
the quintile boundaries. As is the case
with occupations, aggregation is
necessary for the sake of simplicity, but
the data loss inherent in aggregation
makes the data harder to interpret - and
may well overstate the degree of income
mobility in this country.
4. Education. Education is a vital
component of economic well-being: for
many, it is the cornerstone of middle class
self-definition. The intergenerational
transmission of educational advantage is a
subtle and diffuse phenomenon. In the
home environment one internalizes a set
of understandings based at their core on
the familys economic position understandings about time, about the

body, about what it is proper to want and
what it is possible to achieve, about what
it means to understand the world. James
Coleman's studies of racial inequality in
education, which looked at the
transmission of educational advantage
from parents to children, starkly
concluded that family impact is so
pervasive and so impossible to duplicate
that truly equal educational opportunity
cannot be achieved without "removing
the child from the family, the single
institution that provides opportunity
most differentially and unequally, and
placing that child in another social
environment, the same for all children."
In a sense, then, dispositions toward
education transform inherited economic
advantage into what appears to be
"individual" achievement.
The advantages transmitted by
educated parents to their children are
precarious, however. Education is not
only the major method of intergenerational
transmission of economic advantage.
It is also the major route for overcoming
(at least to some extent) the effects of
intergenerational economic disadvantage.
The very societal orientation toward
educational credentials that in the
aggregate serves to perpetuate status
across generations is an imperfect
mechanism for status inheritance at the
level of the individual family: the most
successful of the educationally
underprivileged are always waiting to
take the place of the least successful of
the children of the elite. Thus, whether a
particular family will succeed in the vital
intergenerational game of transmitting
educational advantage is always unknown
while the game is being played. Although
the advantaged win in the aggregate,
every advantaged family is potentially at
risk. This means that the stakes in the
game of class-based affirmative action in
education (which is the field in which
relative familial educational status is most
likely to be considered) are likely to be
very high - and, with them, the demand
for accurate measures of relative
educational advantage.
In that light, the difficulties in
measuring educational attainment and its
intergenerational transmission are
particularly salient. Education is most
often quantified as the number of years
studied or the highest degree attained.
But to treat education as a commodity in
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this fashion is to miss differences that are
palpably relevant in work and in life. On
the college level, for example, educational
attainment is routinely judged in real life
by type of school (four-year college versus
community college, accredited versus
unaccredited, day versus night program,
and so forth); quality of school (often
measured by selectivity or by academic
reputation); content of study (with
superiority of attainment measured for
different purposes along a number of
potentially conflicting dimensions ranging
from raw difficulty to likelihood of
producing cultural literacy); grades and
honors; outside enrichment activities
(overseas studies, for example); and
numerous other more subjective
judgments about the students "character"
as reflected through her curricular
choices. It is highly unlikely that these
distinctions would work their way into
the legal systems official class metric. This
means that if individuals from less
advantaged backgrounds are less likely to
have acquired their (quantitative)
educational credentials in the most
valued (qualitative) form, the
socioeconomic worth of their educations
will be systematically overstated.
5. Consumption. just as inflation can
be measured by the relative cost of a fixed
"basket" of food items, middle class status
is often described as the possession of a
"basket" of middle class goods. When
middle class status is so defined, mobility
into the middle classes is made easier to
the extent that the items in the basket are
easy to identify (through advertising,
popular culture, and so forth) and easy to
afford (as the Levittowns democratized
suburbanization for white urbanites).
At first glance, it would seem easy to
create a quick material index to capture
the key elements of middle class material
consumption. The consumption choice
that most defines ascent into the middle
classes is home ownership - which is
why federal tax policy subsidizes home
ownership and why the fact that young
people cannot afford homes is viewed as
a breach of faith with the middle class. A
conventional consumption index might
include such elements as home
ownership; type of home (stand-alone
versus townhouse versus mobile home);
location (with suburban rating highest,
except for the most exclusive city homes);
home size; the ownership of cars (divided
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by old and new); the purchase of private
primary or secondary education; number
and kind of home electronics (with class
ascending as the ratio of computers and
cellular phones to televisions increases);
the eating of meals outside of the home;
and perhaps the nature of preferred
leisure activities. Such a list, reworked as
required by location (for example, the
lack of home ownership and cars for
many affluent New Yorkers), could
provide broad brush strokes to draw a
line between lower and middle classes.
But as anyone with a good ear for the
culture knows, these elements of
consumption are not so much measures
of class unity as they are fields for the
social process (and processing) of
distinction. Houses can be large because
they have many bedrooms (for many
children) or because they offer grand
spaces for entertaining. Their grounds can
be groomed "just right," too poorly, or too
well. (As Paul Fussell has noted: "If there's
no crabgrass at all, we can infer an owner
who spends much of his time worrying
about slipping down a class or two ... ")
The living room can be furnished from
antique markets or from Sears. Cars can
be utilitarian objects or displays of wealth
and taste; they can be old in order to
demonstrate patrician nonconcern with
material values or because the family
cannot afford new. Food cooked at home
can be traditional or gourmet. The gulfs
in consumption within the "middle class"
category are, in short, huge. The
advertising industry knows this, and it
markets goods not to some broad
aggregate "middle class," but to very
carefully defined segments within it,
defined as much by class aspiration and
cultural orientation as by income.
The material world is a minefield for
the class-mobile, and every dollar spent a
potentially fatal misstep. Consumption
choices shape opportunities for
conversation and for the formation of
friendships and professional networks. (If
tennis is the game of choice at your
office, being a top-notch bowler does you
no good; and try inviting your boss to
dinner if your only table is in the
kitchen.) They are, at the very least, the
most easily observed markers of who you
are and where you fit into the social
hierarchy; they may in fact be an
important part of the constitution of the
self.

In sum, consumption is central to our
(often unarticulated) cultural
understandings of class. It is likely,
however, that the legal system would
choose to ignore consumption as a factor
in determining relative economic
disadvantage. Consumption seems too
"soft" a criterion to belong in a legal
analysis. Alternatively, the law might
formulate an easy-to-implement analysis
of consumption that would make the
mistake of treating differences as
commonalities.
6. Consciousness. Consciousness is
most relevant to class-based affirmative
action as a desirable foundation upon
which to build claims of "diversity" in
hiring and education. Taking studentbody diversity as an example, the
expectation is that students from certain
backgrounds will be able to speak for
distinct perspectives that arise from
shared economic circumstances. For
example, Professor Clyde Summers, a
scholar and teacher of labor law at the
University of Pennsylvania, expressed
concern that "I have almost no students
whose parents are union members and
very few students who come from what
you would call the blue-collar working
class .... What that means is that no one
has any idea what life is like on the other
side of the tracks." Similarly, the claim
can be made that diversity of economic
backgrounds is of value among teachers
and other public servants who must
interact with an economically diverse
population.
Because class consciousness is itself so
problematic, diversity arguments for
class-based affirmative action are not
straightforward. Again my example is
drawn from the educational setting.
Among the various student mutual
support organizations that are a part of
the life of American law schools (for
example, the Black Law Students
Alliance, Latino Law Students
Association, Women Law Students
Association), one rarely finds support
groups for students from less privileged
backgrounds. The reasons are many Part
of the problem is the question of how
much "less" privileged a student would
need to be to join. But I suspect that an
even greater obstacle to organizing is the
unwillingness of "the natives" to define
themselves in terms of class particularly once they have distinguished

themselves as undergraduates and
entered professional school, thereby
breaking all the most obvious constraints
of intergenerational class transmission.
Students from less advantaged
backgrounds have the opportunity to try
to "pass," although they will occasionally
give themselves away through such
telltale signs as dress, hairstyle, use of
cosmetics, accent, and visible discomfort
in formal settings. Such students are also
encouraged to deny class-based
commonalities of experience, both by
prevailing individualistic class ideologies
and by easy access to psychologized
explanations of whatever stress they may
feel.
More fundamentally, to the extent that
affirmative action is a mechanism of
upward class mobility, it is likely that the
most successful of the less privileged
candidates will be those who have already
broken with much of what typifies their
original class position. Given the strains
on family relationships inherent in
childrens upward mobility (even when it
is desired by their parents), it is not clear
that the less advantaged students will
have the capacity to describe fairly their
parents' view of the world. The diverse
perspectives of students from less
privileged economic backgrounds will
likely be the conflicted perspectives of
young adults at a key moment of upward
class mobility - not the pure
perspectives of their classes of origin.
"Consciousness" is the "softest" of all
of the factors that contribute to class. It is
obviously the most difficult factor to
measure, and for that reason
governmental agencies might well
hesitate to consider it at all. But a
program of class-based affirmative action
cannot wash its hands of the problem of
consciousness, because the very existence
of the program will affect consciousness
and will do so in conflicting ways.
The fact that the government is
attending to economic disadvantage will
weigh in favor of individuals accepting
their economic disadvantage as a part of
the identity they present in public life.
Furthermore, it seems likely that classbased affirmative action programs will be
structured to require candidates to selfidentify as "economically disadvantaged."
Those who have best internalized the
governments views of the meaning of
economic disadvantage are most likely to

succeed in presenting themselves as
candidates. In these ways, class-based
affirmative action will increase the level of
consciousness of economic disadvantage
among its beneficiaries and also increase
the likelihood that they will speak
publicly from "class" perspectives. On the
other hand, at least some of the potential
beneficiaries of class-based affirmative
action might prefer to be viewed as
having gained admission under the rules
applicable to mainstream candidates. In
circumstances in which stigmatization is
associated with a characteristic that it is
possible to deny, denial becomes an
attractive strategy: Denial is particularly
attractive where, as in the case of class, a
person seeks admission to a class that is
constituted in part by its belief that class
as such does not exist and that past
economic inequality does not impede
future mobility.
In sum, defenders of class-based
affirmative action ought not to exaggerate
the degree to which beneficiaries of classbased affirmative action programs will
share a common consciousness of
economic disadvantage. The transmission
from parent to child of the consciousness
appropriate to the childs class of origin is
fundamentally changed by the project of
class mobility itself. What is likely,
however, is that the manner in which the
government defines "economic
disadvantage" for the purpose of classbased affirmative action will itself become
the center of a new public "class" identity
- albeit a contested one.
7. Interactions Among the Elements of
Economic Inequality. The relationships
among the elements of economic
privilege are not simply additive or
multiplicative. They are structural. The
factors contributing to relative economic
advantage exist in a delicate balance and
interact in space and time, as is generally
true of the elements of society and
culture. Their effects are likely to be
different for different groups: for example,
those who are better off financially are
in a better position to take advantage of
elite-college degrees than are those of
more modest economic backgrounds.
Thus, the analysis of important
socioeconomic factors and their interrelationships must be "disaggregated,"
with an eye to spotting relevant
discontinuities. No easily administered,
quantitative, composite index of the
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elements of economic inequality can
capture their complex interrelationships.
Indeed, it is most likely that the legal
system will follow its ideological and
practical predilections: it will perceive
complex structures and patterns as the
absence of all structure or pattern and will
conclude that "individual differences" are
the key to inequality and that therefore
the economic individualist theory of
economic inequality is correct after all.
8. Outside Interactions: Race,
Gender, and the Danger of False Claims
of "Holding Class Constant." Up until
this point, we have discussed class as
though it were a hermetically sealed
category, impervious to other forms of
inequality. But it is not. just as economic
variables interact, there are important
interactions between each of those
elements (and their interactions) and
"outside" elements, such as race and
gender.
Gender issues in class analysis are
obscured (or perhaps underscored) by
the fact that studies of social mobility
commonly look only at the experience of
men. The reason is that one of the most
vexing problems in research on class and
economic inequality is how to determine
the economic position of women - both
their individual status and their
contributions as wage-earners and
domestic producers to the economic
status of their households and families.
It should be obvious that ignoring the
economic participation of women distorts
the picture of household or family
economic status in important ways. It
should be even more obvious that an
affirmative action program cannot be
based on an operationalization of
economic inequality or class that is
systematically erroneous in the
measurement of womens economic
status. Indeed, there is ample evidence
that the interactions among economic
factors differ for men and women, that
women are less able than men to take
personal advantage of inherited and
earned economic and social capital, and
that occupational schemes developed for
men are less accurate for women.
Theorizing and measuring the
economic status of members of racial and
ethnic minority groups pose problems of
equal magnitude. I will limit myself to
only a few illustrations of the many ways
in which strategies for the transmission of
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economic advantage from parents to
children have historically been less
successful for blacks than for whites.
The past and present effects of
discrimination mean that blacks and
whites who appear to have the same
occupation, education, or residential
situation when a simple metric is used
may well not occupy the same status
in reality. When black families live in
the suburbs, they tend to live in
predominantly black suburbs that lie
closer to the inner city and that are less
advantaged in their public and private
services. Blacks are more likely to be
employed in the public sector, where
civil-service employment rules diminish
the ability of parents to use their
influence to provide jobs for children in
their community. Although patterns of
segregation are breaking down, black
professionals are historically more likely
to serve within the black community,
which means that having professionals in
the family opens up a less advantaged
social network for blacks than for whites.
Blacks in the professions remain more
likely than whites to be employed in
occupations at the lower end of the
category in credentials, prestige, and
income. Blacks have less wealth than
whites of the same income level. And
skin color remains a powerful obstacle to
the translation of wealth, occupation,
income, education, and cultural capital
into even the most basic dignity in public
life. As one Jewish carpenter explained to
an ethnographer in Brooklyn, New York,
my hometown: "The problem is that we
see blacks as a mass. It is unfortunate. We
can't tell the difference between a black
pimp and a black mailman. When I look
at a white man, I can tell what social class
he is, but if he is colored, I can't tell."
There is little gain to be had from class
mobility if its public indicia are
overwhelmed by the more socially salient
reality of race.
These examples demonstrate that if an
overly simplistic measurement of class is
used, systematic differences in the present
and historical economic condition of
blacks will be ignored, and the
socioeconomic privilege of middle class
blacks will be overstated. The laws
official discourse will falsely proclaim that
in the contest for economic equality, class
has been "held constant" - and that if
blacks still lose, their loss must be
because of some postulated lack of

individual or collective merit. That is a
significant danger for anyone concerned
with racial justice in this country.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CLASS-BASED
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
My expectation is that the most
frequent class metric for affirmative action
purposes will be a standardized
quantification of highly simplified
measures of income, occupation, and/or
education. I refer to this as the "inequality
index." I further expect that
governmental actors (with the possible
exception of college admissions officers)
will resist any efforts to require them to
engage in a more subjective and holistic
analysis of economic position. I do not
think that the inequality index is
adequate on either technical or cultural
grounds, and my expectation that it will
be used is therefore the source of my
pessimism about the operationalization of
economic inequality for purposes of classbased affirmative action.
Let me first explain why I am
convinced that the inequality index will
be the metric of choice for class-based
affirmative action programs. One reason
is captured by the "rules versus
standards" debate in its critical legal
studies variant. Class-based affirmative
action decisions are bound to be
controversial, and the makers of
controversial decisions often prefer to
blame them on "the rules" rather than on
their own judgments. "Standards" may
well be fairer - as I think they would be
in these circumstances - but that does
not make them popular with the
decisionmakers who are required to use
them.
My other reasons are more casespecific. There is, first and foremost, the
sheer difficulty of doing anything more,
for reasons described in the last section.
Social scientists who specialize in the
analysis of one specific element of
economic inequality have great difficulty
in reaching agreement on its proper
definition and measurement. Working
sophisticated versions of multiple
elements into a legal definition of
economic inequality would be beyond
the technical capacity of most social
scientists, let alone most governmental
agencies. It is of course true that
governmental agencies often make

complex decisions: for example,
occupational safety and health standards
or social security disability determinations.
But those decisions are within the
expertise of the agencies. They are what
the agencies exist to do. In contrast,
judgments about how to measure
economic inequality for class-based
affirmative action programs will often fall
well outside the expertise of staffs that are
assembled to do the work of the agencies
(for example, promoting small business,
protecting the environment, supervising
the use of public funds in education), not
for their expertise in affirmative action or
in class analysis. Even if the individual
decisions on who is to be a beneficiary of
class-based affirmative action are made by
human resources professionals, they are
not trained in the fine points of sociology
and labor economics. What is needed is a
standard of complexity appropriate to
nonexperts. I suspect that nothing greatly
more complex than the inequality index
will be seen to suffice.
Another consideration is the highly
personal nature of the information that
government agencies would need to
collect to perform a more sophisticated
analysis of economic inequality: College
financial aid applicants and bidders on
government contracts are already
required to disclose information about
their financial circumstances. However,
the range of information now required is
far narrower than would be required by a
multidimensional and intergenerational
approach to economic inequality: In any
event, job applicants are not currently
expected to provide financial information
to their prospective employers at all,
beyond basic salary history: The fact that
the information would be largely
unverifiable makes it all the less likely
that government decisionmakers will
burden the public and themselves with its
collection and analysis.
Finally, on the ideological level, the
inequality index is likely to seem
satisfactory to the managers and
professionals who will be in the position
to make class-based affirmative action
policy: As I have explained, the ideology
of economic individualism, with its denial
that some groups suffer structural
economic barriers to mobility, is a favored
ideology within the American middle
classes, particularly among successfully
mobile members of the middle classes.

The simpler the metric - the more it
describes an individuals (or family'.s)
momentary circumstances rather than the
deeper family-historical roots of her (or
its) economic position - the more it
resembles the picture of economic
inequality that helps to define the
professional-managerial class.
Having accounted for my view that the
inequality index is the most likely class
metric for class-based affirmative action
programs, I now tum to why that is cause
for pessimism - not merely on cultural
grounds (those reasons are too obvious
from my previous discussion to require
repetition here), but also on technical
grounds.
I would object to the inequality index
on technical grounds even if it could be
proven that it correctly sorts individuals
by their relative economic status in a
substantial majority of cases. Because
class-based affirmative action decisions
will be controversial, I suspect that we as
a society will require a high level of
accuracy from the measurements that
underlie class-based affirmative action
decisions. Legitimacy is, in my definition,
a problem of technical adequacy, and I
doubt that the answer "the result is
wrong for you, but would be right for
most people with your numbers" will be
very satisfying. I am not claiming that a
technically adequate metric must reach
correct results each and every time it is
used. But I suspect it will take only a few
stark examples of distributional injustice
to tum public opinion against class-based
affirmative action.
Furthermore, the question of technical
adequacy turns not only on the quantum
of error (which is difficult to estimate in
any event), but also on the distribution
and social cost of error. The quantum of
error could be extremely low and still be
unacceptable if, as I have suggested,
errors are likely to occur disproportionately
in the evaluation of the economic status
of members of groups that suffer
discrimination in this country.
The remaining question, then, is what
implications to draw from my conclusion
that class-based affirmative action will
most likely be implemented in a
technically and culturally inadequate
form . Does that conclusion require me to
reject class-based affirmative action
altogether? The purist in me says yes. But
the pragmatist in me finds the answer less
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straightforward, on both cultural and
technical grounds.
My concern for the cultural adequacy
of class-based affirmative action programs
stems from my desire to see the law
advance rather than hinder public
discourse on class. Given the laws power
to shape dominant ideologies in this
country; my fear is that the "legal" view of
class - its specific operationalization for
class-based affirmative action - will tend
to be transformed into the only legitimate
view of class within public discourse. But
the best might prove the enemy of the
good. The law is already implicated in the
sorry state of current public discourse on
class. Class is invisible to American
society in part because it is invisible to
American law. While I suspect that it is
easier to counter the present invisibility
of class to the law than it would be to
destabilize an inadequate legally endorsed
definition of class, I cannot be sure. It
might be instead that any legal definition
of class is more adequate than no legal
definition of class, because at least a
definition puts class on the agenda.
If there might be cultural value to
having class on the legal agenda, even if it
is inadequately defined at the outset, the
question once again becomes a technical
one. How might officials charged with
drafting class-based affirmative action
plans keep open the possibility of moving
beyond the inequality index toward a
more adequate conceptualization of
economic inequality? The answer is
suggested by the concept of "systematic
experimentation" in policymaking.
Systematic experimentation is a
continuous process of "developing new
methods, trying them out, modifying
them, trying again," engaged in while the
program is under way with a view toward
future improvements. In that spirit, I
close by suggesting some ways in which
the officials charged with drafting and
implementing class-based affirmative
action plans might move forward but
keep open the possibility for ongoing
technical and cultural innovation.
1. Modesty. Officials should make
only the most modest of claims for their
models and definitions of class. They
should always be ready to admit that
their measures leave much to be desired.
The defense should not go beyond the
claim that the definitions are the best
reasonable minds could do under the
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circumstances. The programs will thereby
be denied the right to claim greater
legitimacy than their flawed models
permit.
2. Task Specificity. Officials should
avoid the claim that they have found a
single definition of class that will be good
for all situations. Definitions should be
specific to the particular affirmative action
program in question and should, to the
degree possible, be based upon an
articulable theory of which kinds of
economic disadvantage are most relevant
to the program at issue.
3. Experimentation. Programs of
class-based affirmative action should be
initiated on a small scale, and pilot
projects should be chosen with care.
Even if a simple metric is used at the
outset, administrators should aim to
collect a wider range of information from
at least a sample of program applicants,
so that more sophisticated metrics can be
developed in the future.
4. Openness. To the extent possible,
task-specific definitions should leave
open the opportunity for affirmative
action candidates to explain why, in their
specific circumstances, the official metric
leads to incorrect results. Such
explanations should be considered, at
least in close cases. But even if these
explanations are not considered in
individual cases, they will provide
valuable information about dimensions of
economic inequality that might be
included in improved metrics in the
future.
5. Race and Gender Sensitivity. It
should be acknowledged that there is a
substantial likelihood that any simple
metric will make the economic status of
members of some minority groups seem
better than it is and that most of the
available metrics were designed with men
rather than women in mind. Data should
be collected on the racial and gender
effects of class-based affirmative action
programs, and experimentation in
measurement methods should include
attempts to make measures more accurate
for women and minorities. If these
experiments fail, or if courts rule even
this level of race and gender
consciousness unconstitutional under
Adarand, class-based affirmative action
should be abandoned.

6. Disclosure. The social distribution of
the costs and benefits of class-based
affirmative action should be measured
and made public. If, as I suspect,
affirmative action decisions will operate
to advantage and disadvantage members
of the middle class who are quite close
together in their economic status, that
fact needs to be admitted to the public.
If governmental actors cannot persuade
the public that the type of economic
redistribution the program in fact
achieves is worthwhile, then class-based
affirmative action should cease.
7. Theoretical and Normative Clarity.
Advocates of class-based affirmative
action should aspire, over time, to a
theory of the nature of economic
inequality in this country and should
then independently evaluate whether that
theory is normatively compatible with the
use of affirmative action as a mode of
redress. That inquiry should, in the end,
address the age-old question whether
aiding the class mobility of individuals is
the best approach to ending class
inequality.
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